Annual vaccination is the most effective way to prevent seasonal influenza. However, globally, the recommendations vary from country to country, ranging from universal recommendations, risk-group-specific recommendations, to no recommendation at all. Due to high diversity both in recommendation practice and country-specific preconditions, it is difficult to determine the effect of different recommendations on vaccine uptake. This incentivised laboratory experiment (N = 288) tests the behavioural consequences of different recommendations in a repeated interactive vaccination game. The participants are part of heterogeneous groups, comprised of low-and high-risk type of players. They receive either a universal, risk-group-specific or no recommendation prior to their vaccination decisions. Results show that individuals are sensitive to the recommendations. In detail, a risk-group-specific recommendation increases vaccine uptake of high-risk types. However, at the same time, it decreases vaccine uptake of low-risk types. The results imply that when the proportion of low-risk types in a population is considerably larger than the high-risk group, a risk-group-specific (vs. universal) recommendation comes at the cost of decreased social benefit of vaccination due to the overall lower vaccine uptake. Policy decision-making should therefore complement epidemiological considerations with potential positive and negative behavioural consequences of vaccination recommendations.
. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in the target groups to which influenza vaccination is recommended. For instance, in the WHO European Region, most countries target only specific high-risk groups that also vary across countries. Frequently, vaccination is recommended to the elderly and people with chronic diseases (Mereckiene et al., 2010) . In contrast, in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention universally recommend influenza vaccination to everyone 6 months of age and older.
The existence of vaccination recommendations is associated with higher vaccination rates at the country level (de Lataillade, Auvergne, & Delannoy, 2009) . Because the recommendation practice and the country-specific circumstances are diverse (e.g., differences in healthcare systems), it is difficult to compare the effects of different recommendations based on country data. Therefore, to better understand the causal relationship between vaccination recommendations and vaccine uptake, we conducted a laboratory experiment testing the behavioural consequences of different recommendations in an interactive and incentivised vaccination game with high-and low-risk type players. We compared the effect of a universal recommendation against a risk-group-specific recommendation, where only high-risk types were recommended to vaccinate. In a control condition, there was no recommendation to any player. Additionally, we explored whether knowledge about the previous vaccination status of other individuals affects vaccine uptake. This experimental set-up allows comparison of the effectiveness of different vaccination recommendations at the individual as well as at the collective level.
We find that vaccination recommendations do indeed affect individual vaccine uptake. Although risk-group-specific recommendations increase a targeted risk group's vaccination likelihood, they also decrease the vaccine uptake of other individuals to whom no recommendation is given. Hence, risk-group-specific recommendations may come at cost of social welfare (i.e., decreased overall protection due to a lack of herd immunity), particularly when the targeted risk groups are relatively small. We will provide an overview of the related literature before describing our experiment and its results in more detail.
Related literature and hypotheses
Vaccination provides a direct effect for the vaccinated individual by reducing his or her likelihood of infection. Additionally, most vaccines also have an indirect effect by reducing the transmission of the disease to other, nonvaccinated individuals (Betsch, Böhm, & Korn, 2013; Bauch & Earn, 2004; Fine, Eames, & Heymann, 2011) . Thus, an individual's decision balances the costs associated with vaccination (e.g., side effects, time, and money) and the benefits (e.g., direct protection against disease and social benefit to others). The more individuals in a society who are vaccinated, the lower the probability of infection and the lower the individual benefit. As a consequence, nonvaccination may become the dominant choice when the vaccination rate is sufficiently high. Considering the social optimum, however, vaccination still remains the optimal choice because it fosters the elimination of diseases. Therefore, vaccination decisions can be described as a prosocial choice. Previous research has found evidence for strategic selfish-rational (non)vaccination and increased vaccine uptake in the case of prosocial appeals (Betsch et al., 2013; Betsch, Böhm, Korn, & Holtmann, 2017) and prosocial preferences (Böhm, Betsch, & Korn, 2016) .
A vaccination recommendation is an expert advice that helps individuals to make evidence-based decisions in complex environments. As such, it might also increase the salience of injunctive vaccination norms, that is, what ought to be done. Research on advice taking in various contexts has shown that people value expert advice (e.g., Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006) . In the context of vaccination behaviour, however, we are not aware of any experimental research providing causal evidence for the effect of vaccination recommendation on vaccine uptake. We hypothesised that vaccination recommendations will increase vaccine uptake of the individuals who are recommended to vaccinate. In line with research on advice taking in other contexts (e.g., Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979) , we expected the effect to be larger with increasing perceived trustworthiness of the recommending institution (i.e., the advice giver).
In real-world vaccination decisions, injunctive norms may conflict with descriptive norms (i.e., what is done rather than what ought to be done). For instance, individuals may realise that only a few others are vaccinating despite a vaccination recommendation. Previous research has shown that the behavioural effectiveness of injunctive norms may be undermined by conflicting descriptive norms (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) . Therefore, we investigated descriptive norms (i.e., feedback on others' vaccination behaviour) at different levels of specificity (i.e., for the whole group vs. separately for each risk group; see e.g., Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008) to explore the effect of descriptive norms on vaccination behaviour under different injunctive norms (i.e., vaccination recommendations).
METHODS

The Interactive Vaccination Game
Participants played the Interactive Vaccination (I-Vax) Game devised by Böhm et al. (2016) . This is an interactive game framework for modelling the direct and indirect effects of vaccination in a group setting. The game was played for 30 rounds (resembling 30 years of annual influenza vaccination) in groups of 12 players with a fixed composition (partner matching). Each participant was endowed with 100 fitness points in every round. The I-Vax Game consists of three phases (see Figure 1a) . In the decision phase, players decide in favour of or against vaccination. In the incubation phase, the consequences of the decision are determined. A player's expected payoff from vaccination or nonvaccination is determined by the player's risk of infection or side effects, respectively. In line with previous research (Brewer et al., 2007; Weinstein, 2000) , the risk of vaccination (side effects) is determined by the product of the probability of infection (side effects) and its expected negative consequences (i.e., severity). Vaccination includes some fixed costs (c fix ). Whereas the probability of vaccination side effects (p side ) is also fixed, the probability of infection (p inf ) varies as a function of the vaccination rate (v, FIGURE 1 (a) Game structure and (b) parametrisation of payoff consequences. Note. Panel (a) visualises the structure of the Interactive Vaccination Game (Böhm et al., 2016) , including its three phases: the decision, the incubation, and the payoff phase. Parameters indicate the fixed costs due to vaccination (c f ix ), probability of vaccination side effects (p side ), and the variable probability of infection (p inf ). Consequences of side effects or infection are either mild (s mi in the case of nonvaccination and c mi in the case of vaccination), medium (s me and c me , respectively), or severe (s sv and c sv , respectively), with fixed probabilities of occurrence (q mi , q me , and q sv ). Panel (b) shows the payoff consequences for each potential outcome, separately for high-and low-risk type of players 0 ⩽ v ⩽ 1) and the basic reproduction number of the disease (R 0 , in this study R 0 = 4), with
In the case of side effects or infection, the consequences are either mild (s mi in the case of nonvaccination and c mi in the case of vaccination), medium (s me and c me , respectively) or severe (s sv and c sv , respectively), with fixed probabilities of occurence (q mi , q me , and q sv ).
In contrast to Böhm et al. (2016) , there are two different player types: In each group, there are four randomly assigned high-risk and eight randomly assigned low-risk type players (labelled "Type A" and "Type B" in the experiment). Participants remain the same risk type during the whole game. The proportion of types approximates the proportion of individuals older versus younger than 60 years (high-risk vs. low-risk) in Western countries (e.g., for Germany, see Federal Statistical Office of Germany, 2015). Losses due to infection or side effects are higher for high-risk than for low-risk types, mirroring a weaker immune system. Hence, in line with the definition of health risks above, risk is manipulated by increasing the outcome severities c and s (see Figure 1b for numerical values of severities c high and s high of high-risk players and c low and s low of low-risk players, respectively) while keeping their probabilities q equal. Importantly, although the absolute payoffs differ between risk types, vaccination yields the best individual response for both types (because both c and s increase at similar magnitude for high-risk compared to low-risk types) as long as the expected number of vaccinated players does not exceed 6 out of 12 in the group (see Table S1 ). Yet the aggregated collective payoff is maximised when nine players vaccinate (eight low-risk types and one high-risk type, see Table S2 ). The I-Vax Game therefore constitutes a social dilemma in which high-risk types profit more from indirect protection (i.e., herd immunity; Betsch et al., 2013; Fine et al., 2011) than low-risk types do. In the final payoff phase, the resulting point loss is calculated based on the individual decisions, their consequences, and the risk type of the player (Figure 1b ).
Ethics statement
The study included human subjects and was conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the Helsinki Declaration and the German Psychological Association. All participants gave their written informed consent to use and share their data for scientific purposes without disclosure of their identity. The experiment was conducted at a German university, where institutional review boards or committees are not mandatory.
Participants and experimental design
Participants were N = 288 students (40.6% female) from RWTH Aachen University in Germany and were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . A 2 (risk type: high-risk vs. low-risk; between-subjects factor) × 3 (vaccination recommendation: no vs. universal vs. risk-group-specific; between-subjects factor) × 3 (feedback: individual vs. universal vs. risk-group-specific; within-subjects factor) mixed design was applied. We controlled for individuals' attitude towards vaccination and social value orientation, as these variables have been shown to predict vaccination behaviour in such game settings (Böhm et al., 2016) .
Procedure and additional measures
The experiment was programmed with z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Participants were randomly assigned to an individual cubicle and completed the incentivised social value orientation slider measure (Crosetto, Weisel, & Winter, 2012; Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011 ; for details, see Supporting Information). Afterwards, they received written instructions for the I-Vax Game (Böhm et al., 2016 ; for instructions, see Supporting Information). All participants had to correctly answer seven control questions to make sure they properly understood the game structure.
Next, all participants received either no information regarding a recommendation, a universal recommendation, or a risk-group-specific recommendation for high-risk types only. There was no incentive to either follow or refuse the recommendation. Before participants made their vaccination decisions, they indicated their trust in the national immunisation technical advisory group, which is responsible for such recommendations (see Supporting Information). 1
In addition to the recommendation manipulation, we implemented three within-subjects feedback treatments (rounds 1-10: payoff of participant's own decision, i.e., point loss; rounds 11-20: additional information about the vaccination rate of the entire group; rounds 21-30: additional information about the vaccination rates of both risk groups). 2 Participants received the respective feedback after each round. One round of each feedback treatment (rounds 1-10, 11-20, and 21-30) was randomly selected for payment (conversion rate: 100 points = 5 Euro). At the very end, participants completed a short post-experimental questionnaire, including three items assessing participants' general attitude towards vaccination (see Supporting Information) and basic demographics.
The experiment took 1 hr and 10 min. After the experiment, participants were informed about their overall payoff and were paid privately (average payoff: €13.65).
RESULTS
Vaccination rates
The raw data are available in the Supporting Information. In the first step, we compared the aggregated vaccination rates between experimental treatments and risk types (for mean values, see Table 1 ; for vaccine uptake per round, see Figure 2 ). The overall vaccination rate in the universal recommendation treatment tends to be higher than in the risk-group-specific recommendation and no recommendation treatment (M Universal = 0.55 vs. Lastly, there were no significant differences between the feedback treatments, either in overall vaccine uptake or in high-or low-risk types' vaccine uptake (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, all ps > .4).
Individual vaccine uptake
We conducted multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression analyses (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000) , using individual vaccine uptake as the dependent variable. As fixed effects, we considered the main effects of the experimental treatments and round, as well as all their interaction terms. We controlled for individuals' social value orientation and vaccination attitude. Omitting these variables leads to the same pattern of results. Observations are nested within individuals (due to repeated decisions), and individuals are nested within groups (due to equal feedback provided to all group members after each round). Therefore, we modelled the individuals and experimental interaction groups as random effects to account for their interrelated error variance.
In Model 1 (Table 2) , the no recommendation treatment serves as the baseline category and is compared with the two recommendation treatments. We found a significant effect of the risk-group-specific recommendation, which is qualified by an interaction effect of risk-group-specific recommendation and risk type. This interaction effect indicates that high-risk types increased their vaccine uptake compared with low-risk types in the risk-group-specific recommendation treatment (vs. no recommendation). The corresponding negative coefficient of the risk-group-specific recommendation treatment indicates a lower vaccine uptake of low-risk types in this treatment compared with the no recommendation treatment. The effects also emerge when comparing the universal versus risk-group-specific recommendation treatments (see Table 2 , Model 2). Furthermore, both models indicate that a positive attitude towards vaccination increased vaccine uptake. 
FIGURE 2
Mean vaccine uptake per round as a function of different recommendations, separately for (a) high-risk types and (b) low-risk types. Note. Vaccine uptake differs especially for the high-versus low-risk types in the risk-group-specific recommendation treatment (solid line). Feedback did not affect vaccine uptake
To explore the impact of an individual's trust in the national immunisation technical advisory group, who provide national vaccination recommendations, we repeated model 2 separately for individuals with high versus low trust (based on median-split; see Table S3 ). The results suggest that the positive effect of the risk-group-specific recommendation on vaccine uptake of high-risk types was slightly larger for individuals who reported more trust in the recommending institution. Similarly, low-risk types only reduced their vaccine uptake when they had greater levels of trust.
In addition to these main results, we were able to replicate some of the most important findings reported by Böhm et al. (2016) , who used the same game paradigm; that is, first, individuals were significantly more likely to change their decision from vaccination in the previous round to nonvaccination in the following round when the group's vaccine uptake in the previous round was above the Nash equilibrium of six players being vaccinated. Vice versa, they also showed the tendency (although not significantly) to be less likely to change from nonvaccination to vaccination when the group's vaccine uptake was above the equilibrium (see Table S4 ). This is evidence for selfish-rational (non)vaccination. Note. Model 1 compares universal and risk-group-specific recommendation to no recommendation (base). Model 2 compares risk-group-specific recommendation to universal recommendation (base). B = unstandardised regression coefficient; OR = odds ratio; SE = standard error. * p < .05. * * p < .01. * * * p < .001.
Second, individuals were significantly more likely to change their vaccination decision when they had experienced losses in the previous round. This effect is significant for both those losses due to infection in the case of nonvaccination and for those losses due to side effects in the case of vaccination (see Table S5 ). Overall, our data are comparable to previous experiments using the I-Vax Game (Böhm et al., 2016) .
DISCUSSION
This study provides causal evidence that vaccination recommendations (i.e., injunctive norms) affect individual vaccine uptake and, in turn, the overall vaccination rate. The data suggest that particularly risk-group-specific recommendations effectively increase vaccine uptake of the targeted risk types, whereas universal recommendations appear to be less effective in increasing uptake of specific risk groups. The effectiveness of risk-group-specific recommendations was slightly stronger for participants who had more trust in the recommending institution but was not affected by the feedback that individuals received on others' vaccine uptake (i.e., descriptive norms on actual vaccine uptake). 3 We conclude that injunctive norms have a greater impact on vaccination decisions than descriptive norms do. Importantly, risk-group-specific recommendations may come at additional costs: Individuals who are not targeted by risk-group-specific recommendations are less likely to vaccinate compared with no or universal recommendations. 4 This is detrimental to social welfare because the overall vaccination rate decreases. Yet, to reduce the likelihood of epidemics and to potentially eliminate diseases, a sufficiently large number of individuals is required to vaccinate and thus to contribute to herd immunity, irrespective of whether they face high or low risks of infection. For example, influenza virus transmission could be brought under control by vaccinating at least 70% of the global population (WHO, 2011) . Importantly, the larger the proportion of individuals who are not targeted in the recommendations, the more negative the effect on protection through herd immunity. When recommendations pertain only to the elderly, for example, it will be crucial that uptake in this high-risk group is close to 100%, as its members cannot rely on herd immunity. This is the case because the individuals for whom vaccination is not explicitly recommended are less likely to vaccinate. Risk-group-specific recommendations thus seem only useful when both high supply and uptake in the high-risk group can be reached, or when herd immunity plays no or only a small role (e.g., with tetanus vaccination; or when general uptake in the population is very low). Effective communication of risk-group-specific recommendations is therefore crucial (Palache, 2011) . 5 Universal recommendations, on the other hand, are debatable from another perspective. When a universal recommendation exists in a population and the respective vaccination rate reaches a certain uptake level below the collectively optimal level (i.e., disease elimination), then vaccination is in fact no longer selfish-rational. Hence, at high uptake rates, universal recommendations suggest individually irrational yet collectively optimal behaviour, undermining the indvidual's tendency to maximise his/her personal health outcomes.
Limitations
This study has some limitations. Risk types were modelled by different severity of consequences imitating a weak immune system in high-risk types. However, there are also high-risk groups that have an increased likelihood of infection (e.g., healthcare personnel). Note that both the probability and severity of a disease determine disease risk (e.g., Betsch et al., 2013; Weinstein, 2003) . Therefore, our results should in principle also hold for risk groups with increased likelihood of infection, which needs to be tested in future research. Moreover, with regard to risk groups, it will be important to replicate the study with participants from actual risk groups (e.g., the elderly).
Conclusion
In summary, we show causal relations between different vaccination recommendations and individual vaccine uptake. The behavioural effects of recommendations should be considered when estimating societal consequences of health policies. These findings may be helpful in designing effective policies aimed at controlling infectious diseases.
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